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THE ITAR TREATY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S.




P RESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH announced on January 14,
2004, a new space policy for the United States.' His Vision for
Space Exploration seeks to refocus the nation on goal oriented
achievement in outer space.2 The policy centers on a human
return to the Moon and then a move towards human explora-
tion of other celestial bodies.' This goal is to be accomplished
by NASA, but in cooperation with the private sector as well as
the international community.4
Commercial investment in space is the key to developing the
necessary technologies to accomplish the President's goals, and
this crucial point is recognized in the policy.5 However, private
sector money often is entirely contingent on a potential for fu-
ture profit. Commercial space exploration seeks to fulfill its
own self-interests, leaving the "glory" of the United States as a
secondary interest at best.6 Unfortunately, the current configur-
ation of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations ("ITAR")
creates a significant impediment to private industry's ability to
reach international markets, as there can be major delays in get-
* PJ. Blount is Research Counsel and Instructor of Law at the National Center
for Remote Sensing, Air, and Space Law at the University of Mississippi School of
Law.
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4 Id. at 7.
5 See id. at 6.
6 This is not to say that aerospace companies are unpatriotic, only that patriot-
ism does not necessarily pay the bills.
705
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AMD COMMERCE
ting approval for exports. This policy is "disconnected from
program requirements and the reality of international space ac-
tivity. '' 7 The obstacle effectively bars smaller entrepreneurial
companies from participating in this market at all, which ad-
versely affects the amount of diversity in innovation. Addition-
ally, violations of these regulations can have "serious
administrative, civil, and criminal consequences," making it a
risky enterprise for all but the most savvy.8
Because both international cooperation and commercial en-
hancement of the space industry are keystones in President
Bush's vision for space exploration, ITAR is an important issue
for the nation's space policy. Additionally, ITAR is an important
issue for the nation's security policy. The issues raised require a
balance between the importance of keeping defense technology
out of the hands of the enemies of the United States and the
importance of allowing the space industry to grow so that the
nation can remain a leader in space exploration.
This article will address the effects of ITAR on the private sec-
tor and the implications ITAR has for the space policy. Sections
II and III will overview the U.S. space exploration policy and
ITAR regimes, respectively. Section IV will seek to investigate
the effects of ITAR on the space industry and how these effects
damage the ability of the United States to effectuate the space
policy. Finally, Section V will examine ITAR treaties and their
ability to deal with the export problems caused by ITAR.
II. SPACE POLICY SPECIFICS
A. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
The President's space policy sets as a specific goal a human
return to the Moon by 2020, followed by a manned exploration
of Mars and unmanned exploration of the rest of the solar sys-
tem.9 The allure of the plan is that it is goal oriented in the way
that early space exploration was during the Apollo missions."
This is particularly important due to the increasing competitive-
ness of international actors in space exploration and the shrink-
7 SATELLITE COMM'N, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUDIES, PRESERVING
AMERICA'S STRENGTH IN SATELLITE TECHNOLOGY Xiii (2002) [hereinafter CSIS].
8 John R. Liebman & Kevin J. Lombardo, A Guide to Export Controls for the Non-
Specialist, 28 Loy. L.A. INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 497, 497 (2006).




ing market share of the U.S. space industry." The plan calls for
the United States to "[p]ursue opportunities for international
participation to support U.S. space exploration goals,"'12 but this
participation still must be beneficial to U.S. policy.
The space policy recognizes that U.S. accomplishments in the
field are "a particularly potent symbol of American democracy,"
but in order for the policy itself to be successful, international
cooperation is a requirement.'3 To this end, the President's
Commission on Implementation of U.S. Space Exploration Pol-
icy ("the Commission") recommended that "NASA pursue inter-
national partnerships based upon an architecture that would
encourage global investment in support of the vision."' 4 The
Commission, which was given the task of determining "the most
appropriate and effective roles for potential private-sector and
international participants" in the new space policy, sought to
find a balance between the need for increased international co-
operation and the interests in protecting the security of the
United States. 15 The Commission noted that, while the interna-
tional climate is different from the one that existed following
the launch of Sputnik, outer space is still a "competitive fron-
tier," and if the United States does not lead the way then "some-
one else will."' 6 Because "[i]t is hard to envision a national
space program based on exploration solely by the United
States," the Commission made the finding "that international
talents and technologies will be of significant value in success-
fully implementing the space exploration vision."' 7 This cooper-
ation, though, cannot be a free for all; the Commission
acknowledges that the United States "must . . . determine its
own requirements, expectations, milestones, and risks" and
"what technologies it is prepared to transfer to the international
partners" before entering into international agreements.' 8 In
light of the Commission's findings, it "recommends that NASA
pursue international partnerships based upon an architecture
11 U.S. AIR FORCE, DEPT. OF DEF., DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE ASSESSMENT: U.S.
SPACE INDUSTRY FINAL REPORT ix-x (2007), available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/
ott/natibo/ExportControlFinalReport083107Master.pdf.
12 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 1, at 53.
13 NASA, THE VISION FOR SPACE EXPLORATION 21 (2004), available at http://
www.nasa.gov/pdf/55583main-vision-space-exploration2.pdf.
14 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 1, at 9.
15 Jd. at 11.
16 Id. at 12.
'7 Id. at 34.
18 [1/
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that would encourage global investment in support of the
vision. '' 9
B. PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT
The space exploration policy as unveiled by President Bush
also envisions a major role for the private sector in U.S. space
exploration policy.2 ° Specifically, the policy states that the na-
tion should "[p]ursue commercial opportunities for providing
transportation and other services supporting the International
Space Station and exploration missions beyond low-Earth or-
bit. '21 The Commission found this sort of activity paramount in
achieving the goals of the space policy, referring to a space in-
dustry "capable of contributing to economic growth" as "a na-
tional treasure. 22
According to the Commission, the space industry, while rely-
ing on "proven players with aerospace capabilities ...should
encourage entrepreneurial activity. '23 The Commission envi-
sions space industry to mean more than a group of entities that
"perform contract work for various government agencies. ' 24 It
states that "a .. .space industry would consist of a variety of
contributors, each vigorously pursuing their own diverse agen-
das. '25 In fact, the Commission sees the "commercialization of
space [to be] a primary focus of the vision, '26 with "an entirely
new set of businesses ... that will seek profit in space. 27
In order to achieve a significant level of private involvement
in space exploration, the Commission recognizes the need to
create "commercial rewards and incentives in space,"28 such as
tax benefits and defining property rights in space.29 Signifi-
cantly, it also recommends that regulatory relief be granted to
the fledgling industry, noting that it is "important to ensure that
this industry not become over-regulated."'30
19 Id. at 35.
20 See id. at 53.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 32.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 31.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 19.
27 Id. at 20.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 33.
30 Id. The small section devoted to this topic mentions liability, occupational
safety, and environmental regulations, but not ITAR. See id.
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The Commission also found that "tapping into the global
marketplace is consistent with our core value of using private
sector resources to meet mission goals."'" This finding connects
private sector involvement with international cooperation by ac-
knowledging that the space industry will need to be able to ac-
cess global markets in order to both make profit and deliver the
high standard of technology that the Vision for Space Exploration
requires. Notably, the Commission recognizes that this goal
does not necessarily conflict with security interests, stating that
"[e]conomic security is also a function of long term competitive-
ness" and that the "technological and industrial base must con-
stantly be renewed" in order to obtain this economic security.3 2
III. ITAR SPECIFICS
A. GENERAL
ITAR is a group of export control regulations that were
adopted under the Arms Export Control Act.33 The Act allows
the government to control the export of defense items, services,
and technical data to other nations, and ITAR is the implemen-
tation of these controls.34 The policy behind ITAR is to further
"world peace and security. 31 5 The crucial section of ITAR is the
United States Munitions List ("USML"), which designates, in
twenty-one categories, articles and data that are considered to
be defense items. 6 If an object is found on the USML, it and
data about it will require licensing by the Department of State's
Director of Defense Trade Controls before the item can be ex-
ported. Of particular interest to practitioners in the space in-
dustry are items such as launchers3 and propellants;3' however,
the inclusion of spacecraft and commercial satellites create the
largest problems for the industry.4"
The bulk of the items included on the USML would still be
subject to export controls by the Department of Commerce as
3' Id. at 34.
32 Id. at 12.
33 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (2000).
34 Id. § 2778 (a) (1).
35 See id.
36 Id.
31 See id. § 2778(b)(1)(B) (2); 22 C.F.R. § 120.1(a) (2008).
38 The United States Munitions List, 22 C.F.R. §121.1 (Category IV) (2008).
39 Id. §121.1 (Category V).
40 Id. §121.1 (Category XV).
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dual use technology,4 but the Department of Commerce pro-
cess for evaluating potential exports is streamlined to be
favorable towards the marketplace. ITAR, on the other hand, is
a complex set of regulations that require a high level of sophisti-
cation to obtain a license. This complexity leads to long waiting
periods for licenses to be granted.
B. ITAR CATEGORY XV: SPACECRAFT SYSTEMS AND
ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT
.This category is the most important one for the commercial
space industry, as it specifically covers satellites and other space-
craft.4 2 Included are "[s]pacecraft, including communications
satellites, remote sensing satellites, scientific satellites, research
satellites, navigation satellites, experimental and multi-mission
satellites. '43 The regulations also cover "[g]round control sta-
tions for telemetry, tracking and control of spacecraft or satel-
lites. '44 Components of space systems are covered as well,
including some GPS technology,45 some radiation-hardened
microelectronic circuits,4 ' and "[aIll specifically designed or
modified systems or subsystems, components, parts, accessories,
attachments, and associated equipment for the articles in this
category. '47 A note in this section, though, excludes some items
if they otherwise are not "specifically designed or modified for
military" use.4s
Technical data on these articles is included, but the terms are
more explicit than in most other categories. Technical data
contemplated by Category XV includes everything covered
under the definition in 22 C.F.R. § 120.9 "as well as detailed de-
sign, development, manufacturing or production data for all
spacecraft and specifically designed or modified components for
41 15 C.F.R. § 730.3 (2008) ("[T]he term dual use serves to distinguish ...
items that can be used both in military and other strategic uses and in civil appli-
cations from those that are weapons and military related use.").
42 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (Category XV)(a).
43 Id.
44 Id. § 121.1 (Category XV)(b).
45 Id. §§ 121.1 (Category XV) (c) (1)-(4).
46 Id. §§ 121.1 (Category XV) (d) (1)-(5).
47 Id. § 121.1 (Category XV)(e). This includes "articles identified in section
1516 of Public Law 105-261: satellite fuel, ground support equipment, test equip-
ment, payload adapter or interface hardware, replacement parts, and non-em-
bedded solid propellant orbit transfer engines." Id.
48 Id. § 121.1 (Category XV) (e) Note. The excluded items cover an array of
different technologies from data recorders to qualified traveling wave tubes. Id.
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all spacecraft systems."4 It also includes "all technical data...
for all launch support activities," which encompasses "technical
data provided to the launch provider on form, fit, function,
mass, electrical, mechanical, dynamic, environmental, teleme-
try, safety, facility, launch pad access, and launch parameters, as
well as interfaces for mating and parameters for launch."50
The regulatory burden on these types of items is made heavier
due to the special regime that applies to these sorts of defense
items. Under this special regime, exporters of a great deal of
space technology must make arrangements for monitoring by
the Department of Defense when working with countries that
are not members of NATO or are not a major non-NATO ally.51
This monitoring must be paid for by the exporter,5 2 and the
monitor must be present for almost all export transactions in
order to assure that only technical data that is covered by the
export license is being exported. 53 Additionally, Department of
Defense monitors must be present at "launch failure (crash) in-
vestigations and analyses. 54
IV. THE PROBLEMS ITAR CAUSES
Both ITAR and the Vision for Space Exploration seek to protect
important national interests of the United States. ITAR seeks to
secure not only national but international peace and security,55
whereas the space exploration policy attempts to facilitate space
exploration through growth of the U.S. space industry.56 The
problem is that ITAR often hinders the stated policy of the Ad-
ministration. Somewhat circularly, security "depends on pre-
dictable, guaranteed access to space, which in turn depends on
a strong domestic space industry. '57 This balancing act is com-
plicated because "[m] any experts hold that the guaranteed abil-
ity to access space is only achieved by maintaining a healthy
domestic industrial base ... and government policies that sup-
port international competitiveness. 58
41 Id. § 121.1 (Category XV)(f).
50 Id.
51 Id. § 124.15(a) (2).
52 Id.
53 Id. §§ 124.15(a)(2)(i)-(iv).
54 Id. § 124.15(b).
55 See 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a) (1) (2000).
56 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 1, at 7.
57 Elizabeth Seebode Waldrop, Integration of Military and Civilian Space Assets:
Legal and National Security Implications, 55 A.F. L. REv. 157, 158 (2004).
58 Id. at 176.
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ITAR significantly hinders the growth of the space industry. It
raises the cost of doing business across the board, which often
sends investors to other sources for technology, and it can effec-
tively bar small entrepreneurial businesses from entering into
international markets. Additionally, it impedes international co-
operation on space programs by making it difficult for civil
space programs to cooperate with foreign programs. This signif-
icantly hinders 'the completion of the stated goals in the space
policy.
Since spacecraft and commercial satellites were transferred to
the State Department's jurisdiction from the jurisdiction of the
Commerce Department in 1999, the U.S. space industry has suf-
fered financial losses.59 The industry has gone from "dominat-
ing the commercial satellite-manufacturing field with an average
market share of 83 percent" to holding only a market share of
50 percent.60 While not all of this decline can be attributed to
ITAR, it is significant that the decline coincides with the addi-
tion of spacecraft and commercial satellites to the USML. 61 Fur-
thermore, this addition is "the only factor that resulted from
U.S. government intervention. '6 2 Recently, at the 58th Interna-
tional Astronautical Congress, numerous speakers classified
ITAR as "a major hurdle in the growth of new space industry
actors," indicating that these regulations might do more than
just damage U.S. business prospects." Representative Ellen 0.
Tauscher cites statistics showing that from 2004 to 2005, "global
satellite revenues decreased by twenty four percent."6 This,
coupled with the decreasing U.S. market share, means a loss of
money for the U.S. industry. The U.S. launch industry revenues
dropped from $2.7 billion in 2000 to $1.5 billion in 2005.65 Sim-
ilarly, satellite manufacturing revenues fell from $6 billion to
59 See id. at 194.
6 Ryan Zelnio, The Effects of Export Control on the Space Industiy, SPACE REV., Jan.
16, 2006, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/533/1.
61 See id. It should also be noted that "[t]here has also been a major downturn
in the economy, particularly affecting the telecommunications industry." Id.
62 CSIS, supra note 7, at ix. These new rules "reinforced trends outside the
United States," doing further damage to an industry "already under substantial
pressure." Id.
63 U.S. Regulations Restrict Space Industry Growth, INDIA PRwiRE, Sept. 27, 2007,
http://www.indiaprwire.com/businessnews/20070927/24683.htm.
64 Representative Ellen 0. Tauscher, Speech to the Center for Strategic and
International Studies: Commercial Satellite Export Controls: Are Things Getting





$3.12 billion in 2004.66 It also has affected the balance of trade;
in 1998 the U.S. imported 19 percent of spacecraft, satellites,
and parts, but imports rose each year after that and reached 46
percent in 2001.67
The manufacture, launch, and insurance on an average ge-
osynchronous orbit ("GSO") satellite can range from $200-500
million. 6 This amount is prohibitive and ITAR can only raise
the cost as well as the hassle. As noted before, the complexity of
ITAR can induce foreign buyers to go to other sellers who are
increasingly beginning to market "ITAR-free" satellites.6" The
ITAR requirements are extensive. ITAR approval is needed for
numerous steps of the export process "including being able to
discuss technical performance details with the customer, ob-
taining insurance for a satellite . . . , exporting a satellite to a
launch base, and being able to talk to ground operators for help
with flying the spacecraft. '70 The length of time that it takes to
gain this approval also is a significant factor. 7' The export li-
cense can take months to be granted and then, due to the price
of these contracts, it must be submitted for congressional ap-
proval, which can take up to thirty days.7 2 The median time for
licensing grants was seventy-one days in July 2006.71 This time
and cost then is exacerbated by end-user requirements which
"require the prior written consent of the State Department
before the item may be retransferred to another end-user or its
end-use changed from what was originally authorized. ' 74 This
significantly hinders the uses that can be made by the client,
especially in light of the deemed export rule, which potentially
66 Id.
67 CSIS, supra note 7, at ix.
68 Zelnio, supra note 60.
69 See id. For example, the European company Alcatel Alenia Space began
marketing an ITAR-free spacecraft. Id. In 2004, the company had doubled its
market share from ten percent to twenty percent. Id.
70 Id.
7' Liebman & Lombardo, supra note 8, at 504. "Since obtaining a license from
[the] State [Department] requires considerable resources and substantial time
and effort, the company must allow adequate lead time between the date the
company accepts an order for goods and the date upon which the company is to
deliver the goods." Id.
72 Zelnio, supra note 60.
73 Tauscher, supra note 64, at 8.
74 Id. at 6.
2008] 713
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
limits which employees within a client's company would be able
to work with the technology. 75
The allure of the ITAR-free satellite is pronounced, and nu-
merous buyers have already taken advantage of these technolo-
gies. Since the change from Commerce to State Department
control, many nations and companies have availed themselves of
these foreign options. For example, Chinese satellite operators
have avoided satellites with ITAR controls, Arabsat awarded two
satellites to Astrium over Lockheed Martin (Arabsat's usual ven-
dor), Canada's Telesat has turned to Astrium, and Intelsat has
awarded a satellite contract to Astrium to avoid the implications
of ITAR.7 6 The regulations also discourage U.S. bidding on con-
tracts that might have large ITAR problems, such as Koreasat 5,
due to its "combined military and civil uses."v77 This means that
U.S. satellite manufacturers have lost up to $6 billion attributa-
ble to ITAR since 1999.78 K-R. Sridhara Murthy, Executive Di-
rector of Antrix Corp Ltd., which functions as the commercial
arm of the Indian Space Research Organization, stated that
"ITAR is the most challenging and difficult regulation we have
to contend with," claiming that "there is more risk to non-U.S.
players. ,79
Commercial space, however, is not the only place that gets hit
by ITAR. In 2005, the European Space Agency pulled out of a
joint venture with NASA for a Mars rover because ITAR would
"[make] cooperation too complicated to be feasible. 8 ' There is
speculation that ITAR "will foreclose whole categories of trans-
Atlantic cooperative efforts in space exploration." '8 1 These
"missed opportunities" could mean that the American "indus-
trial base will continue to shrink."82
Further damage to the industry is done by the fact that ITAR
serves as a bar to smaller companies entering the market as real
competitors. Larger companies, such as Boeing, have extensive
resources and a bastion of lawyers which allow it effectively to
75 See generally Brian F. Walsh & David M. Dunbar, Deemed Exports of Technology,
11 Ci. BAR Ass'N. REc. 46 (1997).
76 Zelnio, supra note 60.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 U.S. Regulations Restrict Space Industry Growth, supra note 63.
80 Peter de Selding, ESA Looks East for Future Space Cooperation, SPACE NEws Bus.
REP., May 30, 2005, http://www.space.com/spacenews/businessmonday-050530.
html.
81 Id.
82 Tauscher, supra note 64, at 5.
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cope with the stringent requirements of ITAR. However, for
small companies, coping with ITAR can be almost impossible.8 3
Smaller entities can be completely overwhelmed by ITAR be-
cause "[r]igorous compliance with the ITAR is essential to the
integrity and success of a company's business operations." 4
These costs can range from simple legal fees to the expenses of
ITAR monitors that must accompany executives when discussing
products with foreign citizens, and are small compared with
those associated with noncompliance. Melissa Farrell, CEO of
Stellar Solutions Aerospace, says that nothing her company does
is "routine," and that "[a] lmost everything [it does] seems to be
an exception which, for a small business, is a tremendous bur-
den."8 5 In the end, smaller companies are forced out of the
market because they are unable to compete-not only with the
large companies in the United States-but also with the numer-
ous companies worldwide that are not burdened with the extra
cost of ITAR imposed on their technology. The Director of
Trade for Intelsat, Kent Bossart, claims that "[o] nly a big com-
pany with a dedicated staff can handle" the rigorous nature of
ITAR, further evincing the way in which ITAR pushes small com-
panies to the side. 6 If Intelsat has problems, then smaller com-
panies will have even bigger problems.
V. THE WAIVER
There is a way around ITAR. The Executive Branch can nego-
tiate a bilateral treaty, which functions as an ITAR waiver that
can help to lessen the effects of ITAR. Specifically, "[b] y reduc-
ing the export control burden on US companies, [a] Treaty
could also encourage smaller US companies to enter the export
market."8 7 However, the requirements for an ITAR waiver are
also stringent and in the end, these waivers may not be effective.
83 See Taylor Dinerman, Space Tourism Meets ITAR, SPACE REv., Oct. 11, 2004,
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/245/1. Dinerman notes that this could
be by design because technology leaks often occur through small companies. Id.
84 Liebman & Lombardo, supra note 8, at 501.
85 Jeff Foust, A New Hope for Export Control Reform?, SPACE REv., Feb. 26, 2007,
http://v.thespacereview.com/article/819/1.
86 Id.
87 AUSTRALIAN GOV'T DEP'T OF DEF., QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: AUSTRALIA U.S.
TRATv ON DEFENSE TRADE COOPERATION 3, available at http://www.defence.gov.
au/publications/treaty-qanda.pdf.
2008] 715
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
A. REQUIREMENTS OF THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT
The Arms Export Control Act envisions the idea that the Ex-
ecutive Branch may want to conclude a bilateral agreement in
order to lessen the effects of ITAR on other countries. Con-
gress, however, imposed severe limitations on the Executive's
ability to accomplish this task.
The first set of conditions for validity of these agreements "re-
quire the foreign country, as necessary, to revise its policies and
practices, and promulgate or enact necessary modifications to
its laws and regulations to establish an export control regime
that is at least comparable" to the U.S. regime.88 The first re-
quirement is that the foreign country require certain conditions
for the handling of defense items with a U.S. origin.89 Specifi-
cally included is that the country require "prior written United
States Government approval for any reexports to third coun-
tries. '"90 The next requirement is that the foreign country re-
quire "end-use and retransfer control commitments. '" 91 These
commitments must be binding and must be secured from all
end-users.92 The third requirement is that the country develop
a "watchlist" if one is not already in existence.93 In addition to
the watchlist, the foreign country must fully "cooperat[e] with
United States Government law enforcement agencies to allow
for sharing of export and import documentation and back-
ground information on foreign businesses," their employees,
and other individuals connected with those businesses.9 4 Fi-
nally, the act requires the compilation of a list of defense items
that "will be exported under the exemption.
95
The second set of conditions requires that the foreign country
bring its laws and policies into a comparable state with U.S. law,
regulation, and policy in the areas of "controls on the export of
tangible or intangible technology," "controls on unclassified in-
formation," and controls on arms trafficking. 96 It also requires
cooperation with U.S. agencies "to combat efforts by [unautho-
88 22 U.S.C. § 2778(j) (2) (A) (2000).
89 Id. § 2778(j) (2) (A) (i).
90 Id.
91 Id. § 2778 0) (2) (A) (ii).
92 Id.
93 Id. § 2778(j) (2) (A) (iii).
94 Id.
95 Id. § 2778 0) (2) (A) (iv).
96 Id. §§ 27780) (2) (B) (i)-(iii).
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rized] third countries to acquire defense items. '9 7 Finally, the
act requires that the foreign country's penalties for violations be
brought in line with U.S. penalties.9"
It is obvious from the text that the Act meant to set a very high
bar for these waivers. The law also requires that the treaty be
submitted to Congress for ratification in order to certify that the
foreign country has indeed performed the items required by the
Act.99
B. CURRENT WArvERS
The United States has recently entered into two ITAR waiver
treaties: one with the United Kingdom and the other with Aus-
tralia. 00 The waiver with the United Kingdom has been trans-
mitted to Congress and is currently under committee review. 1 '
It is a treaty that has long been in the works, originally promised
to the United Kingdom during the Clinton Administration.'012
The agreement was finally signed on June 21 and 26, 2007, at
Washington and London. 103 It was transmitted to Congress on
September 20, 2007, and no further action has been taken.'0 4
The Australia Treaty was concluded on September 5, 2007.105 It
was transmitted to Congress on December 3, 2007.106 The two
treaties are substantially the same, so this article will discuss and
cite to the treaty with the United Kingdom ("the Treaty").
The stated purpose of the Treaty is to provide "a comprehen-
sive framework for Exports and Transfers, without a license or
97 Id. § 2778(j) (2) (B) (iv).
98 Id. § 2778(j) (2) (B) (v).
99 See id. § 2778(j) (3).
100 See Treaty with United Kingdom Concerning Defense Trade Cooperation,
U.S.-U.K.,June 21, 2007, S. Treaty Doc. 110-7 [hereinafter U.K. Treaty]; Treaty
with Australia Concerning Defense Trade Cooperation, U.S.-Austl., Sept. 5,
2007, S. Treaty Doc. 110-10 [hereinafter Austl. Treaty].
101 See U.K. Treaty, supra note 100, at III. See also U.S. Senate, Legislation and
Records Home, Treaties Approved, http://xvww.senate.gov/pagelayout/legisla-
tive/onejitem-and_teasers/trtyrtf.htm [hereinafter Treaties Approved] (last
visited Oct. 21, 2008).
102 Lewis Page, UK Could Get Privileged Access to American Kill-tech, REcGISTER, June
28, 2007, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/06/28/blighty-keys-to-us-gun-
shop-promises-no reselling/. Page notes that the waiver was held up due to
"concerns of certain American congressmen." Id.
103 See U.K. Treaty, supra note 100, at I.
104 See id.; see also Treaties Approved, supra note 101.
105 Austl. Treaty, supra note 100, at I.
106 Id.
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other written authorization, of Defense Articles." 10 7 The Treaty
then goes on to delimit its scope. It only applies to defense arti-
cles for:
(a) United States and United Kingdom combined military or
counter-terrorism operations as described in the Implementing
Arrangements;
(b) United States and United Kingdom cooperative security
and defense research, development, production, and support
programs that are identified pursuant to the Implementing
Arrangements;
(c) Mutually agreed specific security and defense projects
where Her Majesty's Government is the end-user that are identi-
fied pursuant to the Implementing Arrangements; and
(d) United States Government end-use. 0 8
The scope is then further limited by the specification that the
Treaty will not apply to particular defense articles that will be
listed as exempt in the Implementing Arrangements. 0 9
Licenses will only be waived for transfers between the commu-
nities in the United Kingdom and the United States. In the
United Kingdom, the community will consist of government fa-
cilities and personnel as well as some private entities." 0 The pri-
vate entities will be "[s]pecifically identified" and will meet
"mutually agreed eligibility requirements."1 1' They must be ac-
credited by the U.K- government and then both the United
States and the United Kingdom must agree to the entities' inclu-
sion on a list of waived entities. 112 Employees in these entities
will be included if they "meet criteria set out in the Implement-
ing Arrangements" but, at a minimum, they must meet "United
Kingdom security accreditation and a need-to-know." 1 3 Non-
107 U.K. Treaty, supra note 100, art. 2.
108 Id. art. 3(1).
109 Id. art. 3(2). The Implementing Arrangement, however, does not contain
an itemized list of defense articles; instead, it sets forth a procedure for creating
such a list. See generally Implementing Arrangement Pursuant to the Treaty Be-
tween the Government of the United States of America and the Government of
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning Defense
Trade Cooperation, U.S.-U.K., Feb. 14, 2008, available at http://ww.state.gov/t/
pm/rls/othr/misc/101101.htm [hereinafter Implementing Arrangement].
"10 U.K. Treaty, supra note 100, art. 4(1).
III Id. art. 4(1)(c).
112 Id.
11 Id. art. 4(1)(d).
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governmental entities may be removed from the list at the re-
quest of either the United States or the United Kingdom." 4
The U.S. community also consists of government departments
and agencies, as well as private entities. 1 5 Private entities are
those that are "registered with the United States Government
and eligible to export Defense Articles."' 16 Employees of these
entities are included as long as they have the proper security
clearance and a need-to-know when required." 7
All exports made under the Treaty will be identified by the
U.S. government as being exported under the Treaty."' Addi-
tionally, upon entry into the United Kingdom, all items ex-
ported under the Treaty will be identified with the words
"Restricted USML."1 19 This is important because once the item
is in the United Kingdom, it still cannot be re-transferred or re-
exported without "supporting documentation that includes
United States Government approval.' 12° These re-transfers or
re-exports will be subject to "terms and conditions of applicable
authorizations. "121
The Treaty itself is "self-executing in the United States," 122 So
it does not need any underlying legislation by Congress, but will
require congressional ratification. Opposition could be stiff as
well, as there are not only security concerns, but also concerns
that the Treaty could "potentially allow [British] firms to get in-
volved in US projects more easily, perhaps taking work from
Americans."1 23 The Treaty does, however, require Implement-
ing Arrangements which "shall" be concluded "on an expedited
basis."'124 These Implementing Arrangements, however, do not
clear up the numerous ambiguities left in the Treaty. They in-
stead seek to set out the process and procedure that the two
countries will use when negotiating the items covered and the
participants in the two communities. 125
114 Id. art. 4(2).
115 Id. art. 5.
116 Id. art. 5(2).
117 Id.
118 Id. art. 6(2).
119 Id. art. 6(3). This is a minimum; exports could have a higher degree of
demarcation.
120 Id. art. 9(1).
121 Id. art. 9(2).
122 Id. at VI.
123 Page, supra note 102.
124 U.K. Treaty, supra note 100, art. 14(1).
125 See generally Implementing Arrangement, supra note 109.
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C. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE WAIVERS
Whether these waivers will be effective for the space industry
specifically will depend on a number of factors that have yet to
be determined. One of the first questions is whether spacecraft
and commercial satellites will even be covered as objects that
can receive waivers. Under the Treaty, some defense articles
can be declared "exempt from the Scope of [the] treaty."' 26 Ei-
ther government may exclude items from the Treaty, but the
Treaty is silent as to what considerations may be taken for these
exclusions. If these lists are narrow, it "will limit the utility of the
treaties and turn them into elaborate variations on previous un-
successful efforts to facilitate defense trade.1 27 Furthermore,
the scope of the Treaty limits the export of defense articles to
ones used only for certain purposes. The ability to grant a
waiver would depend on whether the satellite or spacecraft was
involved in "combined military or counter-terrorism opera-
tions," "cooperative security and defense research, development,
production, and support programs," "[m] utually agreed specific
security and defense projects" where the U.K. government is the
end user, or U.S. government end-use. 128 Articles not being
used for these sorts of activities will still be subject to ITAR li-
censing. Notably missing are non-military and defense activities
such as commercial satellite systems (including telecommunica-
tions and remote sensing), commercial space exploration, and
joint government civil aerospace activities. Any space systems
that are included most likely will be included in contracts with
larger aerospace corporations as opposed to smaller commercial
firms trying to break into the business. Thus, the positive effects
of the Treaty on the aerospace industry could be negligible.
Another obstacle to the Treaty's effectiveness is the limita-
tions on who may participate in the program. Under the Treaty,
waivers only will be available from a U.S. exporter to the U.K.
government and to specific nongovernmental entities.1 29 These
entities must "meet mutually agreed eligibility requirements."'130
Then there will be a question of what personnel at the nongov-
ernmental agency will be allowed to use the export. The Treaty
126 U.K Treaty, supra note 100, art. 3(2).
127 Christopher Wall, Thomas M. deButts & Ada L. Loo, New Defense Trade
Treaties Will Streamline ITAR Licensing 3 (Oct. 3, 2007), http://www.pillsbury
law.com/publications.
128 U.K. Treaty, supra note 100, art. 3(1).
129 See id.
130 Id. art. 4(1)(c).
720
THE ITAR TREATY
sets as a minimum that personnel must meet "appropriate
[U.K.] security accreditation and a need-to-know" standard. 1 '
This potentially could be a high standard for many U.K. compa-
nies. Since the United Kingdom is a member of the European
Union, British companies likely will have employees that are Eu-
ropean foreign nationals. This could be a major problem if
these employees are in high-level positions or are technical ex-
perts in light of the deemed export rule. It also should be noted
that the Implementing Arrangement calls for the list to take into
account "[floreign ownership, control or influence."'32 The in-
ability of some persons to get U.K. security clearance most likely
will limit the number of nongovernmental entities that can par-
ticipate in the U.K. community.
Finally, the Treaty still maintains the strict rules on re-transfer
of technology to third parties.133 This will encourage private
companies to seek ITAR-free technology in lieu of waiver tech-
nology. If a commercial enterprise is incorporating technology
into its products, then it must be free to sell those products.
Since exports that enter the United Kingdom under the waiver
still will be subject to ITAR for the purposes of re-transfer or re-
export, companies will not necessarily be given enough incen-
tive to take advantage of these waivers. This is especially so in
the space industry since the United Kingdom lacks a launch site
of its own. Space technology would have to be launched from
the United States or an ITAR license would have to be gained,
which would defeat the waiver and add to the cost. In light of
this, ITAR-free technology is still the more marketable
technology.
VI. MAKING THE WAIVER SYSTEM WORK
If the Vision for Space Exploration is to be effective, steps should
be taken to limit the effects of ITAR on the commercial space
industry. It is unlikely, though, that Congress will remove space
technology from the USML. The ITAR waiver system could
serve as a solution in some cases, but these waivers must be tai-
lored for the space industry to be effective.
The Bush Administration should lobby for space industry-spe-
cific waivers with space partners of the United States. If a waiver
could be gained for partners such as the European Space
13 Id. art. 4(1)(d).
132 Implementing Arrangement, supra note 109, at 9.
133 See U.K. Treaty, supra note 100, art. 9.
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Agency, a great deal of international cooperation could be re-
stored. These waivers could also include nongovernmental enti-
ties within the territories of our space partners. These
agreements likely would have to be limited in a way similar to
the Treaty in order to make it through the ratification process,
but the conclusion of such a treaty would allow for some pro-
gress by opening up markets piecemeal. In so doing, the U.S.
government could maintain control over the export of sensitive
space technologies and at the same time allow U.S. commercial
entities access to markets of trusted allies.
These waivers should include a regime wherein it can be de-
termined whether a particular piece of technology should be
subject to ITAR upon re-transfer or re-export. Specifically, the
regime should investigate whether the technology is such that its
export could harm international peace and security. The oft
cited example of an ITAR license being required for a satellite
component that can be purchased at Radio Shack could be
avoided by a built-in review process. If the regime takes into
account worldwide availability and the security interest served, it
would be able to develop a system that would be favorable to
both commercial space policy and security interests. In so do-
ing, it would help reallocate resources to better protect a more
complete idea of national security.
VII. CONCLUSION
The hurdle that ITAR creates is such that it could hamstring
both the national space policy and the commercial space indus-
try. Furthermore, it could create challenges for the national se-
curity that it seeks to protect. ITAR reform should be
approached with caution as it does serve a purpose in protecting
national security. With such balancing in mind, the bilateral
agreements allowed under the Arms Export Control Act may be
the best short-term solution for easing ITAR issues for the space
industry. This solution could allow for the space industry to be
competitive in countries that represent U.S. space partners.
These treaties will have to be crafted with care in order to meet
the stringent requirements under U.S. law, but if done properly,
would allow for renewed U.S. cooperation with international
actors.
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